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CAN A LATIN TRINITY BE SOCIAL?  
A RESPONSE TO SCOTT M. WILLIAMS
William Hasker
Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity holds that the trinitarian 
persons have between them a single set of divine mental powers and a single 
set of divine mental acts. He claims, nevertheless, that on his view the persons 
are able to use indexical pronouns such as “I.” This claim is examined and is 
found to be mistaken.
Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity has a number of impres-
sive features.1
It is presented against a broad background of historical trinitarian 
thought, yet it employs some distinctively modern concepts in arriving at 
its own account of the Trinity. Williams criticizes standard social models 
of the Trinity and puts his own view forward as a Latin model, yet he also 
claims to fulfill the requirements for a social model. He recognizes the 
central difficulty for models of the Trinity that hold that the divine persons 
have only one set of divine mental powers between them, and attempts to 
resolve it.
Another distinctive feature is his choice of interlocutors for his presen-
tation. Richard Swinburne, Brian Leftow, and I are far from being fully 
in accord in our trinitarian proposals; in fact, we have criticized one an-
other on important points. But all of us, according to Williams, share a 
common flaw, which results from the assumption of a “modern notion 
of personhood.” He quotes my statement, following Cornelius Plantinga, 
that the divine persons are “distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and 
action . . . distinct centers of consciousness.”2 This notion of the persons 
is also held by Swinburne, but Leftow’s view is somewhat different. For 
him, there is only one divine person in this sense; the trinitarian persons 
are three distinct, parallel life-strands of experience, whereby the one and 
only divine person (namely, God) lives his life. For all three of us, however, 
1Williams, “Unity of Action.”
2Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 24. 
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each divine person performs his own cognitive and volitional acts, acts 
which are “incommunicable” in the sense that they are not and cannot be 
the acts of any other person.3 And this means that each divine person has 
his own set of cognitive and volitional powers, which are likewise incom-
municable. (Call this the “multi-power” view.) Williams holds that this is 
a mistake: on his view, all divine acts are communicable, and in fact are 
common to all three divine persons. Correspondingly, there is only one 
set of divine cognitive and volitional powers, grounded in the one con-
crete divine essence or substance which is common to the three persons.4 
(This is the “one-power” view.) It is this difference that, according to 
Williams, creates the difficulty that makes his opponents’ views unsatis-
factory. In what follows we first consider Williams’s objection to the views 
of Swinburne, Leftow, and me; we then go on to examine his own view 
in detail.
In pursuing these topics I will not, in general, be discussing the various 
theological authorities Williams cites as support for various features of 
his view. I do, however, want to call attention to a distinction which may 
assist us in evaluating these appeals. This is the distinction between the 
content of a mental act, and the act itself. When millions of voters cast 
their votes in favor of a particular candidate, there is in a sense “one will” 
between them: they all will that N_____ should be elected. But of course, 
the mental acts by which they will this are as numerous as the voters 
themselves. To take an example that may be closer to the trinitarian case, 
when two humans are in love each wills the same thing: that each should 
love the other. But while the content of their willing may be the same, the 
acts are distinct: he wills “that I shall love her, and that she shall love me,” 
and she wills “that I shall love him, and that he shall love me.” The impor-
tance of this distinction becomes apparent when some authority asserts 
that the trinitarian persons have “one will” between them. Only when it 
is evident that what is being asserted is that there is a single act of will for 
all three persons, does the assertion count in favor of Williams’s view of 
the Trinity.
Williams’s objection to his opponents focuses on the “necessary agree-
ment” (NA) that must obtain between the wills of the three divine persons. 
3Williams states, “A feature of this conception, as I understand it, is that a person is a 
person by being constituted (at least in part) by cognitive acts, or by being identified with a 
stream of intellectual and volitional acts” (“Unity of Action,” 327). This is a mistake. It may 
be correct as applied to Leftow’s view of the trinitarian persons, but it is incorrect as applied 
to Swinburne’s and my own.
4There is a distinction made by Williams, or rather a related pair of distinctions, that 
I am unable to comprehend. Following Henry of Ghent, he distinguishes between active 
intellectual powers and passive intellectual powers. He explains the difference by saying, 
“Active intellectual power is that by which a person can produce and can use mental tokens,” 
whereas “passive intellectual power is that by which a person can be united with a mental 
token and can be united with an individual use of a mental token.” Unfortunately, I find 
this latter distinction as opaque as the former, so it does not help me to understand what is 
being said. I do not believe these distinctions are crucial to the other matters discussed in the 
present essay, but I am not certain about this.
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This means that the wills of the persons cannot fail to agree on anything. 
If, as Williams proposes, there is between the persons only one faculty of 
volition and only one act of willing with regard to any matter, NA is easily 
seen to follow. If on the other hand each person has his own faculty of will 
and his own act of will with regard to some matter, it seems that there is a 
possibility of disagreement. Williams recognizes that Swinburne, Leftow, 
and I all affirm NA, but he holds that the explanations we give for NA’s 
obtaining are inadequate.
The possibility of disagreement can arise only in certain situations. If 
one conceivable course of action is morally prohibited, that course will 
not be a live option for any divine person. And on the other hand, if one 
course of action, among those that would be morally permissible, is clearly 
rationally preferable to any other in the circumstances, once again the per-
sons will automatically agree and there is no possibility of disagreement. 
But where there are “permissible alternatives,” where no moral prohibi-
tion applies and none of the alternatives is rationally preferable, it would 
seem that there might be disagreement between the persons. (Swinburne’s 
example concerns the direction in which the earth revolves around the 
sun.) Might it not be that the “initial preferences” of the persons might be 
different? Both Swinburne and I accept that this might occur, and we pro-
pose different ways in which the disagreements might be resolved so as to 
prevent an actual conflict of wills. Swinburne supposes that, in bringing 
about the existence of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Father might desig-
nate “spheres of influence” in which each of the persons would decide the 
issue, if the initial preferences of the persons should differ. I, on the other 
hand, have suggested that in the event of differing preferences the per-
sons, recognizing the undesirability of conflicting wills, would voluntarily 
come to a resolution that all would accept.
Williams states, “I find appeals to an agreed upon moral reason or rule 
for such cases to be theologically and philosophically unsatisfying.”5 The 
reason he states for this dissatisfaction is that such appeals “insufficiently 
secure NA.”6 Now it is true that, where human beings are concerned, 
any predictions which rely on the assumption that people will follow the 
dictates of reason and morality must fall well short of absolute certainty. 
But would this be true of divine persons? Consider again my proposal, 
noted above. Would divine persons, endowed with supreme wisdom and 
goodness, not recognize that it would be a very bad thing for them to op-
pose their wills to one another? And recognizing this, would they not find 
an acceptable way to resolve their different preferences?7 The answers, it 
5Williams, “Unity of Action,” 322. 
6Williams, “Unity of Action,” 322. 
7One referee finds this inadequate, because a trinitarian model “is supposed to give a 
specific way that the three persons subsist that necessitates their agreement,” and my pro-
posal fails to do this. I believe, however, that in this case the requirement is unreasonable. 
Human beings of good will, in a comparable situation, might find a number of different 
ways to resolve their initial disagreement: is it supposed that I ought to be able to discern 
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seems to me, are obvious—and if so, it is not the case that proposals such 
as Swinburne’s and mine leave NA insufficiently secured.
It should also be noted that the multi-power view is not tied logically 
to the possibility of different preferences among the persons. Leftow does 
not accept this possibility, and I express considerable hesitation about the 
possibility, though in the end I do accept it. It could be that, in view of 
the fact that the powers of all the persons are grounded in the one con-
crete divine nature they all share, in view also of the interpenetration and 
complete mutual awareness of the persons implied by the doctrine of 
perichoresis, that even this minimal form of non-agreement between the 
persons is impossible. I have stated, “In the absence of further compelling 
arguments on either side, it seems to me that either answer to the ques-
tion [about the possibility of different preferences] is consistent with the 
rest of what needs to be said concerning the Trinity.”8 If this is right, then 
Williams’s argument based on NA cannot be conclusive against the views 
he is criticizing.9
Even if Williams has failed to refute the views of Swinburne, Leftow, 
and me, it still might be the case that he has presented an alternative that 
is superior to any of them. In view of this, we need to examine his own 
view carefully. A natural place to begin is with his conception of the divine 
persons. As we have seen, he rejects the modern conception of a person, 
stated by me, as “distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and action . . . 
distinct centers of consciousness.” His own definition is derived from 
Richard of St. Victor, as follows: a person is “an incommunicable existence 
of a rational nature.”10 In spite of the difference in style and wording, this 
definition has considerable extensional overlap with my definition. Both 
definitions will apply to human persons as well as to angels. The im-
portant difference, however, concerns the mental acts and mental powers 
of the persons. The modern conception requires that the acts should be 
“incommunicable,” that is, that the mental acts belong essentially to the 
person who is their subject, and cannot be or become the acts of any other 
person. Williams’s definition, however, leaves it open that these acts and 
powers are communicable. Furthermore, in the case of the divine persons 
this possibility is realized: on Williams’s “one-power” model, there is just 
one set of mental powers, and all divine mental actions are common to all 
three persons. So persons as understood under the modern notion will 
which of these ways (as opposed to some divine process I know nothing about) the divine 
persons would use? In any case, if this suggestion is thought unsatisfactory, the problem can 
be avoided altogether by denying that initial disagreements are possible.
8Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 210. 
9It could be that Williams is not claiming to have a conclusive objection, but is merely 
pointing out that his own view secures NA more economically, without the further as-
sumptions utilized by Swinburne and me. Questions about economy, however, need to be 
addressed to the theories as a whole, not just to special features of each view. I believe some 
of the assumptions needed for Williams’s own view (see below) are considerably more prob-
lematic than the assumptions invoked by Swinburne and me.
10Williams, “Unity of Action,” 326. 
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qualify as persons under Williams’s definition, but the converse is not nec-
essarily the case. The divine persons are not persons in the modern sense.11
If we try to form some conception of what the inner life of God might 
be like on this conception, we run into difficulties. One might think that 
the persons are really superfluous: we could simply attribute the divine 
mental acts to the single divine substance (which would then constitute 
a person in its own right), and let the three persons go. But this will not 
do; each person is an “incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature,” 
and the intellectual nature guarantees that the persons can have conscious 
experiences and be the subjects of mental acts of cognition and volition. 
And yet, there is only one consciousness and one set of mental powers 
and mental acts! The closest I am able to come to imagining this is to think 
of science-fiction scenarios in which an alien race (or perhaps humans in 
a “more evolved” state) exist in a “group mind,” in which all thoughts, 
beliefs, and volitions are fully shared, and the individual organisms are 
important only as means for carrying out particular volitions. To be sure, 
many readers find these scenarios repellent rather than attractive. It is 
clear that on this view no divine person will be able, on his own, to origi-
nate any act of divine will.
This leads to some interesting thoughts concerning the Incarnation. 
In some very brief remarks on this topic Williams states, “on my view a 
consequence of the Incarnation is that God the Son has and uses created 
mental tokens in addition to divine mental tokens.”12 I suggest that this 
underplays the significance of the change made by the Son’s becoming 
incarnate. Once incarnate, the Son has human volitions as well as divine 
volitions. These human volitions, however, are the volitions only of the 
Son, and not also of the Father and the Holy Spirit. But this means that 
only the Son now has the power to originate volitions of his own, without 
the other two divine persons simultaneously (and in the same act) willing 
the same thing. This power is one that Father and the Spirit can never 
possess, unless of course they also, at some point, become incarnate. And 
this means that the Incarnation can seem less a kenosis or humiliation, and 
11It seems to me that there is a need for additional evidence to establish that Richard 
of St. Victor viewed divine mental powers in line with the one-power model. (Clearly, this 
does not follow merely from the fact that his definition does not specify that the acts and 
powers are incommunicable.) Lacking such evidence, there is reason to doubt that his is a 
one-power view. Consider in this regard his well-known explanation of why there are three 
divine persons: A perfectly loving person needs another person of equal worth to fully exer-
cise the attribute of love, and two such persons who love each other will have their love fully 
perfected only in their mutual love for a third person. Here the Father’s generation of the Son 
is seen as a motivated, volitional act, albeit one that is inevitable due to the superior excellence 
of a multi-person Godhead—not merely as the automatic operation of the non-personal di-
vine nature. Furthermore, this act must be an act only of the Father; it cannot be an act also 
of the Son and the Holy Spirit, since the act is presupposed by their very existence. So the 
Father does have the power to perform acts of his own, not shared by the other two persons. 
And if so, it would seem to follow from the homoousion that the Son and the Spirit also have 
corresponding powers.
12Williams, “Unity of Action,” 339. 
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more a metaphysical augmentation or enhancement of the Son. I believe one 
will have difficulty finding places in the classical literature on the Incarna-
tion where the subject is viewed in this light.
Now however we must turn to what Williams recognizes as the most 
serious challenge to his view, the “argument from the essential indexical 
‘I’.” Leftow states the problem succinctly:
[D]id the whole Trinity will, “The Son shall become incarnate?” The Son 
could not learn from that that he would become incarnate unless he could 
also think to himself, in effect, “I am the Son, so I shall become incarnate.”13
This thought, however, must be a thought of the Son alone, and not of the 
Father or the Holy Spirit. Williams cites me as claiming that only the Son 
willed that “I shall become incarnate.”14 Williams summarizes the implied 
argument as follows:
1. If the Son wills that i (where i shall stand for the proposition that I shall become 
incarnate) and the Father and the Holy Spirit do not will that i, then the divine 
persons have numerically distinct (and incommunicable) will powers.
2. The Son wills that i and the Father and the Holy Spirit do not will that i.
3. Therefore, the divine persons have numerically distinct (and incommunicable) 
will powers.15
The argument is evidently valid; Williams’s project is to undermine the ar-
gument by falsifying the first premise. In order to do this, he must provide 
a way in which the Son alone can will that i, without the persons’ having 
numerically distinct will powers. His way of doing this is both ingenious 
and quite complex.
The first major step is the introduction of divine mental tokens. Williams 
begins by establishing some points about tokens in general. In spoken 
communication, the creation of a token sentence by the speaker generally 
coincides with its use, and the token has only one occasion of use. This 
need not, however, be true of tokens in general. A simple example is a 
stop sign used by the flagger at a highway construction project. Each time 
the flagger holds the sign up, a separate command is issued: namely, that 
the vehicles then approaching should come to a stop. On another day, the 
flagger at a different construction project can use the same stop sign. And 
the workers at the factory that produced the sign issued no commands 
whatever in producing it.
This establishes that the same token can express multiple propositions 
(or in this case, commands) on different occasions of use. Williams, how-
ever, needs to have it that a single token can express multiple propositions 
on the same occasion. For this, he turns to J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit. In 
the opening scene of this classic, Bilbo is standing outside his front door 
13Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” 70. 
14See Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 206–207. 
15Williams, “Unity of Action,” 337.
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smoking his pipe, when along comes Gandalf. “Good morning!” says 
Bilbo, to which Gandalf tartly replies, “What do you mean? Do you wish 
me a good morning, or mean that it is a good morning whether I wish it 
or not; or that you feel good this morning; or that is a morning to be good 
on?” Bilbo answers, “All of them at once.”
Now, I think one could reasonably doubt whether Bilbo really did ex-
press all of these propositions by his conventional greeting; some of them 
may simply be accepted after the fact as possible interpretations. But if we 
do accept the multiple meanings at face value, it is worth noticing that all 
of the different alternatives offered by Gandalf are possible only because 
Bilbo’s greeting was extremely vague in what it expressed.
But why must we posit divine mental tokens in the first place? We 
humans do sometimes formulate mentally sentences of our language, in 
order to think our thoughts. But it is hardly evident that we must always 
do so.16 And as Williams acknowledges, we could say that “divine persons 
affirm and will propositions without using a mental token of a sentence 
type.”17 His reason for rejecting this is that in this case we will have to ac-
cept that there are distinct cognitive and volitional powers for each divine 
person. In other words, the postulation of divine mental tokens is a cost of 
Williams’s theory; it is not something that is evident in its own right.
Now, however, we need to see how the tokens enable us to solve the 
problem of essential indexicals. We begin with the simplest case, in which 
one divine person affirms of himself something that is true of all three—
for example, “I am wise.” When the Father affirms that “I am wise,” this 
affirmation entails that the Father thinks the Father is wise, and similarly 
for the Son and the Holy Spirit. In general, any time a token of “I” is used, 
the referent of the token is the person using that token. So when the three 
persons use this token, different propositions are thereby expressed. 
(This parallels the situation with Bilbo, in which several propositions are 
expressed by the same use of a token.) In ordinary circumstances, when 
several persons use the same token to express different propositions, 
there is a distinct use of that token for each of the propositions expressed. 
But in the trinitarian case, where the persons have only one set of mental 
powers between them, there is only one use of the token “I am wise,” a use 
which is common to all three persons. Nevertheless, “The divine persons 
are aware of different propositions if they use a mental token with the 
indexical ‘I’ in it.”18
Things become more complex when the token expresses something that 
is true of only one divine person. If the Father says, “I am the Father,” this 
use of that mental token expresses the proposition that the one speaking 
16Consider the case of Helen Keller, who lived for a number of years when she did not 
even have the concept of a language. It is, I think, wholly incredible that during those years 
she did not think any propositions.
17Williams, “Unity of Action,” 333. 
18Williams, “Unity of Action,” 330.
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is, in fact, the Father. But of course, the Son cannot use the expression “I 
am the Father” to express the proposition that he, the Son, is the Father—
obviously not, because he isn’t the Father. To understand how all three 
persons can share in the one mental act of using that token, we need to 
take account of an ambiguity in the copula, “am.” According to Williams,
[W]hat the copula expresses is relative to the agent using the token. If the 
agent is the same person as the person mentioned in the predicate, then the 
copula expresses identity. If the agent is not the same person as the person 
mentioned in the predicate, then the copula expresses numerical sameness 
without identity.19
In view of this,
If the Son uses the same mental token of “I am God the Father” . . . the Son 
affirms the proposition that the Son is essentially numerically the same di-
vine nature as the Father without being identical to the Father.20
(Henceforth I shall refer to this as the NSWI [numerical sameness without 
identity] interpretation of the copula.) Once again, in view of the con-
text-dependent reference of “I,” as well as the multiple interpretations of 
the copula, we are able to have different true propositions expressed by 
each of the persons in virtue of a single use of one divine sentence-token. 
Williams states, “This way of analyzing mental tokens that include the 
indexical “I” and the ambiguous copula is a general theory for divine 
mental tokens.”21
As we seek to evaluate the NSWI interpretation of the copula, the reader 
is asked to bear with me in a simple but admittedly far-fetched thought 
experiment. Suppose the Holy Spirit says to Peter, “I am God the Father, 
who sent the Son to be the Savior of the world.” Sometime later Peter 
learns that it was in fact the Holy Spirit who spoke thus to him. Peter is 
troubled by this; he complains that he has been misled, perhaps even lied 
to. The Holy Spirit, however, explains that there was no intentional deceit; 
the problem was rather one of translation. The message given to Peter was 
first formulated in the divine language of thought. Peter, of course, does 
19Williams, “Unity of Action,” 331. This concept of numerical sameness without identity 
is the same as Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea’s (“Material Constitution and the Trinity”) 
concept of “sameness in number without identity.” An example they give: a hand is not 
strictly identical with a fist, but we “count them as one”: we do not say that a man has two 
things at the end of his arm, a hand and a fist. And while a divine person is not strictly iden-
tical with the divine nature, the person and the nature together are “counted as one.” I have 
reservations about the notion of numerical sameness without identity, but will not go into 
them here. For further discussion, see Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 131–137. 
20Williams, “Unity of Action,” 331. There is a potential mistake here which needs to be 
guarded against. If the Son is essentially numerically the same as, but not identical with, the 
divine nature, then the Father must also be essentially numerically the same as, but not iden-
tical with, the divine nature. It does not follow from this, however, that the Son is essentially 
numerically the same as, but not identical with, the Father. (Non-identity is not a transitive 
relation.) To be sure, the Son is non-identical with the Father, but this does not follow from 
the conjunction of the NSWI statements.
21Williams, “Unity of Action,” 332.
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not know this language, so the message was translated into Greek in order 
to be conveyed to him. The formulation given to Peter was the best avail-
able translation into Greek of the original message in the divine mental 
language. However, a problem arose with regard to the copula “am.” In 
divine mentalese, that copula is ambiguous as between expressing iden-
tity and expressing the NSWI interpretation. The copula in Greek (as in 
other human languages) lacks this ambiguity, so the ambiguity was not 
conveyed to Peter. As a result, he misunderstood the message and mis-
takenly identified the speaker of the message as God the Father. (The 
correct interpretation of the message is, “I am numerically the same as, but 
not identical with, the divine nature that is numerically the same as, but not 
identical with, God the Father, who . . . etc.”) The mistake is regrettable, 
but there was no deception involved.
So far, perhaps, so good. But I submit that at this point the ambiguity of 
the divine mental language is beginning to be troubling. All human lan-
guages suffer from ambiguity and vagueness to different degrees. This is 
inevitable, because we acquire the ability to make precise discriminations, 
both in sensory perception and in thought, only over an extended period 
of time, and perfection is never attained or even closely approximated. 
There is also the fact of the limited processing capability of human brains. 
None of these limitations, however, apply to divine persons, and I think 
we would naturally expect a divine language of thought to be very pre-
cise indeed, perhaps maximally so. But in the NSWI interpretation of the 
copula, we find a major ambiguity in the divine language of thought, one 
that affects matters of great intrinsic importance—and an ambiguity that 
human languages manage to avoid without much difficulty. To say that 
this seems incongruous is an understatement.
Indeed, the identity-vs.-NSWI ambiguity has implications that reach 
even farther than we have seen so far. Given this ambiguity, no sentence 
can be formulated in the divine language of thought that refers specifically to one 
of the three divine persons. Any referring expression used to refer to a divine 
person (say, the Holy Spirit) can be understood as, “the person who is 
NSWI to the divine essence, which is NSWI to [the referring expression 
in question], who . . . ” The person so referred to can be any of the three 
divine persons—even the Holy Spirit himself, since the NSWI relation 
is non-transitive. So acts of referring easily accomplished in human lan-
guages are impossible in the divine mental language!
This does not mean, of course, that the divine persons could not know 
to whom they were referring. Just as we humans often use ambiguous ex-
pressions but know clearly which proposition we are intending to express, 
so a divine person could use an expression of divine mentalese knowing 
full well whether he intended to refer to Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. 
But this prompts us to wonder, why would the divine persons bother with 
tokens in the ambiguous language of thought? Why would they not think 
directly in terms of propositions, as Williams admits that they could? In any 
case, divine persons enjoying the mutual interpenetration of perichoresis 
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would hardly need a language in order to communicate with each other—
and surely no creature could understand such a language. It is hardly 
satisfactory at this point to reply that there must be a divine mental lan-
guage because otherwise a particular theory of divine mental powers could 
not be made to work!
There remains one more topic to be addressed: How we are going to 
go about counting divine mental acts, for example the acts of using a 
mental token to express a proposition? Until now we have passed over 
this issue, but now the question needs to be addressed. Suppose, for ex-
ample, both the Son and the Holy Spirit make use of the sentence-token, 
“I shall become incarnate.” (In this example I am supposing that the 
Holy Spirit will in fact become incarnate, whether on this planet or some 
other.) Here we have two persons using a token to express two distinct 
propositions, propositions that are logically contingent and also logically 
independent of each other. Does it not seem evident that we have here two 
different uses of one and the same token? Isn’t this the only plausible way 
to read the situation? Williams’s answer seems to be that it must be only 
one use, because the persons have only one set of mental powers between 
them. Surely, however, this is inadequate. Williams has shown that the 
“one-use” answer is required by his theory of divine powers. But this does 
nothing to counteract the otherwise apparent fact that we have here two 
distinct uses of that token. When Williams’s theory is being criticized for 
its adequacy and coherence, it is question-begging to appeal to that same 
theory in order to overrule potential objections.
A further, telling point is highlighted by an assertion Williams makes 
as he is explaining how all three persons can make use of the same mental 
token of the sentence, “I am wise.” “When the Father affirms that ‘I am 
wise’,” he tells us, “this affirmation entails that the Father thinks the Father 
is wise.”22 And so also for the Son and the Holy Spirit. But then comes the 
telling remark: “The divine persons are aware of different propositions if they 
use a mental token with the indexical ‘I’ in it.”23 Precisely. Williams could 
not have told us any more clearly or explicitly that the divine persons 
are in different mental states as each of them makes use of the one token of 
the sentence “I am wise.” And indeed it must be so, if we are to explain 
how the persons are able to grasp and to assert propositions containing 
indexicals. But here’s the rub: To be aware of a proposition is precisely to per-
form a mental act. And we have been told that in this instance the persons 
are aware of different propositions, which must surely mean that they are 
performing different mental acts. What could be clearer than that? And if 
this is so, it cannot be the case that the persons have between them only 
one set of divine mental powers, and one set of divine mental acts.
We are now able to give an unequivocal answer to the title question of 
this discussion, “Can a Latin Trinity be Social?” If a Latin theory must be 
22Williams, “Unity of Action,” 330. 
23Williams, “Unity of Action,” 330 (emphasis added). 
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a “one-power” theory, and a Social Trinity one in which the persons can 
assert propositions including the essential indexical “I,” then the answer 
must be that it cannot. This is a problem not only for Williams, but for any 
and all one-power views of the Trinity. In order to account for the use of 
such indexicals by the divine persons, a theory of the Trinity must allow 
that the persons can engage in “incommunicable” mental acts which be-
long to one person alone, and that they have the powers that are needed 
to make such acts possible. And to admit this, is to take a large step in the 
direction of a view of the Trinity that will be truly and properly social.24
Huntington University
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